[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
objects we are envisioning would be tied together in pack-
ages, by virtue of the way the world works. For that is how
it actually is with the essential properties of actual familiar
objects, as I argued in chapter 2. Hence any case in which
one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essen-
tial properties will be a case in which it loses several.
Finally, then, suppose it is simply false that the envisioned
familiar objects are compositionally vague. Then each such
object can survive removals of individual component
microparticles only up to a point. Beyond that point, remov-
ing any one microparticle will bring it about that that object
no longer exists that a cluster of properties essential to that
object no longer is present where just a moment ago the
object existed.
It follows, by the point about supervenience, that once
this critical point were reached, the removal of any single
microparticle anywhere would bring about large-scale
alterations in the causal interactions occurring among the
A Response to Compositional Vagueness 123
remaining component microparticles. Indeed since a
number of familiar properties would all be departing in
tandem any removal of any one microparticle anywhere
would bring about a number of large-scale alterations.
But then a familiar medium-sized object, reduced to this
critical point, would put the lie to the thesis of chapter 3.
Such an object would be so tightly organized, at the micro-
physical level, that the departure of any single microparti-
cle anywhere would have large causal consequences on the
behavior of virtually all the other microparticles in the
object. Turning the point around, the causal interactions in
which any microparticle in the object engaged, just before
the fatal removal of a single microparticle, would depend
on the presence in the object of all the other microparticles
including the one that gets removed, and this one could
by any one of the others.
6.2 Objects Not Compositionally Vague Appear
Vulnerable to Causal Exclusion
But then familiar objects of the brittle sort we are imagining
would be exactly the sort of objects in which the causal
exclusionists must believe, as we saw in chapter 4. They
would be objects whose causal efficacy were rivaled at every
turn by causation at the level of microparticles. For then
there really would be, at the level of microphysics, such a phe-
nomenon as microparticles being car-wise arranged, or as
their being James-wise or parking-lot-wise arranged. There
really would be, at the level of microphysics, such a phenom-
enon as the microparticles together composing a material
parcel or lump exactly coincident, spatially, with James (or
Max), with James s car, and with the parking lot at Super-
market S.
124 Chapter 6
Then the nerve of chapter 4 s defense of familiar objects,
against causal exclusion arguments, would be killed. The
microphysical outcome that composes into James s arrival
at Supermarket S might not, after all, be an uncaused acci-
dent. For if microparticles within James s car are causally
sensitive to their membership in that familiar object, they
very well might be causally sensitive to relations obtaining
between that object and James or between that object and the
road or the parking lot. There might be a cause of the car
microparticles arrival above the parking lot microparticles
even while surrounding the James microparticles (just as the
town crier might have caused simultaneity between my
arrival at the agora and my debtor s, 4.3). So there would
truly be reason to worry that, because of Alexander s
dictum, familiar objects of the brittle sort do not really exist,
in ontological strictness.
Let us now return from these speculations. Almost every-
one agrees that in the actual world, familiar objects are not
thus brittle; they really are characterized by something like
compositional vagueness (pace Markosian 1998; Sorensen
1988, p. 10). But now we can see why they are so character-
ized. They are so characterized because their essential famil-
iar properties supervene on causal transactions that their
component microparticles between them do, not on causal
transactions that their component microparticles do all in
concert. That is, what subvenes the familiar properties that
familiar objects possess are localized microphysical interac-
tions that their component microparticles engage in inter-
actions that do not depend on the presence in that object of
all the other microparticles, interactions that exercise no
causal influence on every last other such microparticle.
That is why the familiar properties essential to a given
familiar object can go on being present can go on being
A Response to Compositional Vagueness 125
subvened even if any single microparticle is removed from
the familiar object. In other words, that is why the removal
of a single microparticle, from a familiar medium-sized
object, leaves that object still existing.
But at the same time, the familiar properties essential to
a given familiar property must supervene on some micro-
physical transactions among the microparticles within that
object. If most component microparticles are removed from
a familiar object, that object s essential familiar properties
must depart; the object must cease to exist. The microparti-
cles within a familiar object are, as subvenors of its familiar
properties, causally loose knit, and this looseness of knit
explains both why the object can survive departure of any
one microparticle and why it cannot survive the loss of a
great many.
But such looseness of knit does not seem a paradoxical or
unbelievable feature of familiar objects; on the contrary, it
seems entirely believable, and itself almost familiar. (Recall
how unsurprising my response in 3.3 to the objection about
the billiard ball seemed to be.) How then can it entail a para-
doxical or unbelievable consequence? It does entail, I have
just said, that any familiar object can survive the departure [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl ocenkijessi.opx.pl
objects we are envisioning would be tied together in pack-
ages, by virtue of the way the world works. For that is how
it actually is with the essential properties of actual familiar
objects, as I argued in chapter 2. Hence any case in which
one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essen-
tial properties will be a case in which it loses several.
Finally, then, suppose it is simply false that the envisioned
familiar objects are compositionally vague. Then each such
object can survive removals of individual component
microparticles only up to a point. Beyond that point, remov-
ing any one microparticle will bring it about that that object
no longer exists that a cluster of properties essential to that
object no longer is present where just a moment ago the
object existed.
It follows, by the point about supervenience, that once
this critical point were reached, the removal of any single
microparticle anywhere would bring about large-scale
alterations in the causal interactions occurring among the
A Response to Compositional Vagueness 123
remaining component microparticles. Indeed since a
number of familiar properties would all be departing in
tandem any removal of any one microparticle anywhere
would bring about a number of large-scale alterations.
But then a familiar medium-sized object, reduced to this
critical point, would put the lie to the thesis of chapter 3.
Such an object would be so tightly organized, at the micro-
physical level, that the departure of any single microparti-
cle anywhere would have large causal consequences on the
behavior of virtually all the other microparticles in the
object. Turning the point around, the causal interactions in
which any microparticle in the object engaged, just before
the fatal removal of a single microparticle, would depend
on the presence in the object of all the other microparticles
including the one that gets removed, and this one could
by any one of the others.
6.2 Objects Not Compositionally Vague Appear
Vulnerable to Causal Exclusion
But then familiar objects of the brittle sort we are imagining
would be exactly the sort of objects in which the causal
exclusionists must believe, as we saw in chapter 4. They
would be objects whose causal efficacy were rivaled at every
turn by causation at the level of microparticles. For then
there really would be, at the level of microphysics, such a phe-
nomenon as microparticles being car-wise arranged, or as
their being James-wise or parking-lot-wise arranged. There
really would be, at the level of microphysics, such a phenom-
enon as the microparticles together composing a material
parcel or lump exactly coincident, spatially, with James (or
Max), with James s car, and with the parking lot at Super-
market S.
124 Chapter 6
Then the nerve of chapter 4 s defense of familiar objects,
against causal exclusion arguments, would be killed. The
microphysical outcome that composes into James s arrival
at Supermarket S might not, after all, be an uncaused acci-
dent. For if microparticles within James s car are causally
sensitive to their membership in that familiar object, they
very well might be causally sensitive to relations obtaining
between that object and James or between that object and the
road or the parking lot. There might be a cause of the car
microparticles arrival above the parking lot microparticles
even while surrounding the James microparticles (just as the
town crier might have caused simultaneity between my
arrival at the agora and my debtor s, 4.3). So there would
truly be reason to worry that, because of Alexander s
dictum, familiar objects of the brittle sort do not really exist,
in ontological strictness.
Let us now return from these speculations. Almost every-
one agrees that in the actual world, familiar objects are not
thus brittle; they really are characterized by something like
compositional vagueness (pace Markosian 1998; Sorensen
1988, p. 10). But now we can see why they are so character-
ized. They are so characterized because their essential famil-
iar properties supervene on causal transactions that their
component microparticles between them do, not on causal
transactions that their component microparticles do all in
concert. That is, what subvenes the familiar properties that
familiar objects possess are localized microphysical interac-
tions that their component microparticles engage in inter-
actions that do not depend on the presence in that object of
all the other microparticles, interactions that exercise no
causal influence on every last other such microparticle.
That is why the familiar properties essential to a given
familiar object can go on being present can go on being
A Response to Compositional Vagueness 125
subvened even if any single microparticle is removed from
the familiar object. In other words, that is why the removal
of a single microparticle, from a familiar medium-sized
object, leaves that object still existing.
But at the same time, the familiar properties essential to
a given familiar property must supervene on some micro-
physical transactions among the microparticles within that
object. If most component microparticles are removed from
a familiar object, that object s essential familiar properties
must depart; the object must cease to exist. The microparti-
cles within a familiar object are, as subvenors of its familiar
properties, causally loose knit, and this looseness of knit
explains both why the object can survive departure of any
one microparticle and why it cannot survive the loss of a
great many.
But such looseness of knit does not seem a paradoxical or
unbelievable feature of familiar objects; on the contrary, it
seems entirely believable, and itself almost familiar. (Recall
how unsurprising my response in 3.3 to the objection about
the billiard ball seemed to be.) How then can it entail a para-
doxical or unbelievable consequence? It does entail, I have
just said, that any familiar object can survive the departure [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]