[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
did not know most of the information it contains.
were forced to acknowledge this. After prelimi- PRC, urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist
2. M. Yu. Prozumenshchikov and I.N. Shevchuk,
nary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, the speeding up of the negotiations and the con-
Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1953-59, paper presented
the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put clusion of an armistice. Such a position by the
to the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold
forward a proposal for settling the military con- Chinese coincided with our position. For the
War History, Moscow, 12-15 January 1993.
flict in Korea. As a first step, the Soviet repre- implementation of practical measures ensuing
3. Another conference participant, David Holloway,
sentative declared, it would be necessary to from the complicated situation, a special repre- professor of political science at Stanford University,
begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armi- sentative was sent to Pyongyang from Moscow in was the first to follow up on this footnote, asking for and
receiving the file cited. He then mentioned the signifi-
stice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the March 1953 with a proposal for speeding up the
cance of this document to a Russian participant,
38th parallel. This proposal attracted universal peace negotiations. By that time the Koreans also
Vladislav Zubok, who then called me to suggest I look
attention. showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid
at it. I am grateful for Vlad s and David s collegiality
On June 27, 1951, the American Ambassa- cessation of military activity.
and am happy to report that it is characteristic of the
dor [to Moscow Alan G.] Kirk visited A.A. On July 27 an armistice agreement was
interaction among researchers working on postwar for-
Gromyko (at that time deputy minister of foreign signed in Panmunjom.
eign relations in Moscow archives over the past year, a
affairs of the USSR) and appealed to him with a The armistice agreement fixed the military situation which is largely the result of existence of the
Cold War International History Project.
number of questions in connection with these demarcation line and provided for the withdrawal
4 . With regard to the survey as a whole, similar internal
proposals. Elucidating to Kirk the position of the of troops 2 km from this line to create a demilita-
histories that I, as well as other scholars working on the
Soviet government, Comrade Gromyko indicated rized zone, [and] provided for a cease-fire and
postwar period, have seen in recent months have been
that the negotiations on the armistice must be withdrawal of troops of both sides from the de-
accurate in their factual details, though limited in their
conducted by representatives of the joint Ameri- militarized zone within 72 hours after the armi-
analysis and scope.
can command and the command of the South stice agreement takes effect. [Here follows a
5. Though most knowledgeable observers at the time
Korean troops, on one side, and by representa- listing of the terms of the agreement K.W.]
and many historians since have asserted that it was
tives of the command of the Korean People s absurd to think that Kim Il Sung could have prepared
and initiated such a major military action without
Army and the command of the Chinese volun- V. The Korean Question after the Armistice
Stalin s approval and aid, some scholars have contin-
teers, on the other. Comrade Gromyko noted that
The conclusion of the armistice in Korea
ued to argue that Kim may have acted on his own, and
the negotiations must be limited to military ques- created the preconditions for a peaceful reunifi-
that, indeed, the North Korean attack on June 25 may
tions and first of all the question of a cease-fire.
cation of the country. The first step in this
have been a response to a provocation from the South,
On June 29, Ridgway, who was at that time
direction must be the convening of the political
as the DPRK and the Soviet Union have maintained.
the commander of the U.N. troops in Korea,
conference envisioned in the agreement.
The most important statement of this argument is in
appealed over the radio to the commander of the
Because of the sabotage of the USA, a Bruce Cumings monumental study, The Origins of the
Korean People s Army Kim Il Sung with a pro- political conference on Korea was convened only
Korean War, Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract,
1947-1950 (Princeton; Princeton University Press,
posal to begin negotiations for an armistice.
on April 26, 1954, in Geneva. The American
1990), 439-65, 568-621. See also Gye-Dong Kim,
July 1, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai broad-
delegates applied maximum efforts to prevent the
Who Initiated the Korean War? in James Cotton and
cast over the radio a joint answer to Ridgway s
adoption of the proposals of the DPRK, USSR,
Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Manches-
appeal. The answer expressed their agreement to
and PRC that aimed to create on the Korean
ter, England: Manchester University Press, 1989), 44;
meet with representatives of the American com- peninsula a single, genuinely democratic govern-
and Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before
mand to conduct negotiations for the cessation
ment. The conference did not adopt any con-
Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1986), 28.
of military activity and the establishment of
structive decisions on Korea. 6. This agrees with the account in Khrushchev s
peace. memoir, which emphasizes that the war wasn t Stalin s
The Korean question has remained until
idea, but Kim Il Sung s. Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrush-
The negotiations of the representatives of
now within the framework of the U.N. and is
chev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 367-8.
the commands of the warring sides began on July
considered unresolved. It is a subject of discus-
7. A recent statement of this interpretation is in Adam
10, 1951, and continued, with breaks, for more
sion at every regular session of the U.N. General
Ulam, The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost
than two years, until the end of July 1953.
Assembly. The government of the DPRK speaks
Illusions: 1948-1991 (New York and Toronto: Charles
In the course of the negotiations such basic
out against the discussion of the so-called Korean
Scribner's Sons, 1992), 81-82.
questions were discussed as: the establishment of
question in the U.N. and in favor of disbanding
8. For detailed studies of the U.S. intervention, see, e.g.,
a line of demarcation between the two sides for
the Commission on the Reunification and Res- James Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American For-
the creation of a demilitarized zone as a condition
toration of Korea and the withdrawal of Ameri- eign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1985); Charles M. Dobbs, The Un-
for the cessation of military activity in Korea; the
can troops from Korea. This position of the
wanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold
elaboration of practical measures for implement- Korean leadership is fully supported by the So-
War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
ing the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, includ-
viet government.
University Press, 1981); and William Whitney Stueck,
ing the staff, authority and functions of an appa-
Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Foreign
ratus for observing the implementation of the
FROM MATERIALS OF THE
Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel
conditions of the cease-fire and armistice.
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).
By the beginning of May 1952, an agree-
9. See Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and
ment was reached on all questions, with the
(Storage Center for Contemporary Documenta- the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evi-
dence From Russian Archives, CWIHP Working Pa-
exception of the question regarding prisoners of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl ocenkijessi.opx.pl
did not know most of the information it contains.
were forced to acknowledge this. After prelimi- PRC, urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist
2. M. Yu. Prozumenshchikov and I.N. Shevchuk,
nary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, the speeding up of the negotiations and the con-
Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1953-59, paper presented
the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put clusion of an armistice. Such a position by the
to the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold
forward a proposal for settling the military con- Chinese coincided with our position. For the
War History, Moscow, 12-15 January 1993.
flict in Korea. As a first step, the Soviet repre- implementation of practical measures ensuing
3. Another conference participant, David Holloway,
sentative declared, it would be necessary to from the complicated situation, a special repre- professor of political science at Stanford University,
begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armi- sentative was sent to Pyongyang from Moscow in was the first to follow up on this footnote, asking for and
receiving the file cited. He then mentioned the signifi-
stice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the March 1953 with a proposal for speeding up the
cance of this document to a Russian participant,
38th parallel. This proposal attracted universal peace negotiations. By that time the Koreans also
Vladislav Zubok, who then called me to suggest I look
attention. showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid
at it. I am grateful for Vlad s and David s collegiality
On June 27, 1951, the American Ambassa- cessation of military activity.
and am happy to report that it is characteristic of the
dor [to Moscow Alan G.] Kirk visited A.A. On July 27 an armistice agreement was
interaction among researchers working on postwar for-
Gromyko (at that time deputy minister of foreign signed in Panmunjom.
eign relations in Moscow archives over the past year, a
affairs of the USSR) and appealed to him with a The armistice agreement fixed the military situation which is largely the result of existence of the
Cold War International History Project.
number of questions in connection with these demarcation line and provided for the withdrawal
4 . With regard to the survey as a whole, similar internal
proposals. Elucidating to Kirk the position of the of troops 2 km from this line to create a demilita-
histories that I, as well as other scholars working on the
Soviet government, Comrade Gromyko indicated rized zone, [and] provided for a cease-fire and
postwar period, have seen in recent months have been
that the negotiations on the armistice must be withdrawal of troops of both sides from the de-
accurate in their factual details, though limited in their
conducted by representatives of the joint Ameri- militarized zone within 72 hours after the armi-
analysis and scope.
can command and the command of the South stice agreement takes effect. [Here follows a
5. Though most knowledgeable observers at the time
Korean troops, on one side, and by representa- listing of the terms of the agreement K.W.]
and many historians since have asserted that it was
tives of the command of the Korean People s absurd to think that Kim Il Sung could have prepared
and initiated such a major military action without
Army and the command of the Chinese volun- V. The Korean Question after the Armistice
Stalin s approval and aid, some scholars have contin-
teers, on the other. Comrade Gromyko noted that
The conclusion of the armistice in Korea
ued to argue that Kim may have acted on his own, and
the negotiations must be limited to military ques- created the preconditions for a peaceful reunifi-
that, indeed, the North Korean attack on June 25 may
tions and first of all the question of a cease-fire.
cation of the country. The first step in this
have been a response to a provocation from the South,
On June 29, Ridgway, who was at that time
direction must be the convening of the political
as the DPRK and the Soviet Union have maintained.
the commander of the U.N. troops in Korea,
conference envisioned in the agreement.
The most important statement of this argument is in
appealed over the radio to the commander of the
Because of the sabotage of the USA, a Bruce Cumings monumental study, The Origins of the
Korean People s Army Kim Il Sung with a pro- political conference on Korea was convened only
Korean War, Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract,
1947-1950 (Princeton; Princeton University Press,
posal to begin negotiations for an armistice.
on April 26, 1954, in Geneva. The American
1990), 439-65, 568-621. See also Gye-Dong Kim,
July 1, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai broad-
delegates applied maximum efforts to prevent the
Who Initiated the Korean War? in James Cotton and
cast over the radio a joint answer to Ridgway s
adoption of the proposals of the DPRK, USSR,
Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Manches-
appeal. The answer expressed their agreement to
and PRC that aimed to create on the Korean
ter, England: Manchester University Press, 1989), 44;
meet with representatives of the American com- peninsula a single, genuinely democratic govern-
and Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before
mand to conduct negotiations for the cessation
ment. The conference did not adopt any con-
Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1986), 28.
of military activity and the establishment of
structive decisions on Korea. 6. This agrees with the account in Khrushchev s
peace. memoir, which emphasizes that the war wasn t Stalin s
The Korean question has remained until
idea, but Kim Il Sung s. Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrush-
The negotiations of the representatives of
now within the framework of the U.N. and is
chev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 367-8.
the commands of the warring sides began on July
considered unresolved. It is a subject of discus-
7. A recent statement of this interpretation is in Adam
10, 1951, and continued, with breaks, for more
sion at every regular session of the U.N. General
Ulam, The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost
than two years, until the end of July 1953.
Assembly. The government of the DPRK speaks
Illusions: 1948-1991 (New York and Toronto: Charles
In the course of the negotiations such basic
out against the discussion of the so-called Korean
Scribner's Sons, 1992), 81-82.
questions were discussed as: the establishment of
question in the U.N. and in favor of disbanding
8. For detailed studies of the U.S. intervention, see, e.g.,
a line of demarcation between the two sides for
the Commission on the Reunification and Res- James Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American For-
the creation of a demilitarized zone as a condition
toration of Korea and the withdrawal of Ameri- eign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1985); Charles M. Dobbs, The Un-
for the cessation of military activity in Korea; the
can troops from Korea. This position of the
wanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold
elaboration of practical measures for implement- Korean leadership is fully supported by the So-
War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
ing the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, includ-
viet government.
University Press, 1981); and William Whitney Stueck,
ing the staff, authority and functions of an appa-
Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Foreign
ratus for observing the implementation of the
FROM MATERIALS OF THE
Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel
conditions of the cease-fire and armistice.
FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).
By the beginning of May 1952, an agree-
9. See Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and
ment was reached on all questions, with the
(Storage Center for Contemporary Documenta- the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evi-
dence From Russian Archives, CWIHP Working Pa-
exception of the question regarding prisoners of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]